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I. UNDER THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
ACT, LEGAL ISSUES ARE REVIEWED DE NOVO WITH 
NO DEFERENCE TO THE AGENCY'S DECISION. 
As this proceeding was initiated after January 1, 1988, 
the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") applies. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4)(d), BJ-Titan Services Company 
("BJ-Titan") appeals the Utah State Tax Commission's (the "Com-
mission") Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Deci-
sion, issued July 2, 1990 ("Final Decision"), on the grounds that 
the Commission has "erroneously interpreted or applied the law" 
as to the first three issues presented in this proceeding. 
These issues are legal issues: specifically, whether services 
rendered by BJ-Titan, and the transfer of motor vehicles to 
BJ-Titan, are subject to sales taxation under the provisions of 
the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (the "Act") (Utah Code Ann. SS 
2 
59-15-1 et. s ea . (1985) ) . The underlying fac t s in t h i s case are 
not in d i spute ; rather, the proper construct ion of the s a l e s tax 
s t a t u t e and the interpretat ion of e x i s t i n g case law w i l l d e t e r -
mine the t a x a b i l i t y of these t ransact ions . 
The wel l e s tab l i shed standard for reviewing an agency's 
d e c i s i o n based on a l ega l i s sue , as applied to both pre- and 
post-APA c a s e s , i s de novo with no deference to the agency's 
d e c i s i o n . For instance , the Utah Court of Appeals in Bevans v. 
1
 I. Whether services provided by BJ-Titan were incidental to the sale 
of tangible personal property? 
II. Whether BJ-Titan is a real property contractor? 
III. Whether the transfer of motor vehicles to BJ-Titan qualifies as an 
isolated or occasional sale? 
2
 Now codified in Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-101 et JUEKJ. (1987) (as amended 
(Supp. 1990)) and known as the Sales and Use Tax Act. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
applying post-APA law, cited with .approval the official comment 
to the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedures Act, Section 
5-116(c)(4), as follows: 
[W]ith regard to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of the law, the comment 
states, "courts generally give little defer-
ence to the agency, with the result that a 
court may decide that the agency has errone-
ously interpreted the law if the court merely 
disagrees with the agency's interpretation." 
Id. at 575 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals went on to state: 
We conclude that, under section 
63-46b-16(4) (d) of the UAPA, it is still 
appropriate for a court to review an agency's 
interpretation of its statutorily granted 
powers and authority as a question of law, 
with no deference to the agency's view of the 
law. 
Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
The Commission cites to Boyd v. Dept. of Employment 
Sec. , 773 P.2d 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) for the proposition that 
some weight should be given to the Commission's Final Decision. 
As set forth in Boyd: 
While "[a]n agency's interpretation of key 
provisions of the statute it is empowered to 
administer" should be given due weight, 
. . . if that agency has "misconstrued or 
misapplied" the statute "it is the duty of 
the court to correct the same." 
Boyd at 400 (emphasis added, citations omitted). However, Boyd 
does not stand for the proposition that an agency's decision is 
automatically given weight. Boyd sets forth that it is only the 
agency's interpretation of key provisions of a statute which may 
be given consideration. In the present case, with respect to the 
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services issue, there are no statutory terms or provisions in the 
Act to be-44iterpreted. Only those services specifically listed 
in the Act are subject to sales taxation. Clearly absent from 
the Act is any reference to well stimulation services of a type 
performed by BJ-Titan. Any authority to tax BJ-Titan's services 
evolves from Utah case law which provides that services inciden-
tal to the sale of tangible personal property are subject to 
sales taxation. 
As explained in Hurley v. Board of Review of the Indus-
trial Comm'n of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 528 (Utah 1988), it is the 
courts, not administrative agencies, who have the expertise to 
construe statutes and decide legal issues. 
The facts here are not in dispute. Nor is 
there dispute about the application of the 
law to the facts. The real dispute is 
solely, what does the law require? Specifi-
cally, the issue is, when does the 52-week 
eligibility period begin to run under 19 
U.S.C. S 2293(a)(2)? That is a straightfor-
ward issue of statutory construction. Reso-
lution of the issue would not be aided by 
agency expertise, and no term of art is at 
issue. Indeed, it is the courts that have 
expertise in matters of this nature, not an 
administrative agency. See Dean Evans 
Chrysler Plymouth, 692 P.2d at 782. Of 
course, the statute and regulations, once 
properly construed, must be applied to the 
facts of the case, but that does not make the 
issue one of mixed law and fact. There is, 
in short, no reason to accord the Board a 
zone of reasonableness in its construction of 
the law. The Board either read the statute 
and regulations correctly, or it did not. 
The Commission also cites to First N'l Bank of Boston 
v. County Board of Equalization, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (October 
16, 1990) that the substantial evidence standard of review should 
be applied to the Commission's findings of fact under Utah Code 
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Ann. S 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 6 ( 4 ) ( g ) . In F i r s t N ' l Bank of Boston t h e "only 
i s s u e f o r - r e v i e w [was] the accuracy of the Tax Commissions f i n d -
i n g s of f a c t " ( i d . a t 8 ) ; t h e r e f o r e , the s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e 
t e s t was a p p r o p r i a t e l y a p p l i e d in t h a t c a s e . L i k e w i s e , t h e s u b -
s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t e s t shou ld apply t o the f o u r t h i s s u e in t h i s 
3 
p r o c e e d i n g . However, the s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t e s t does not 
apply t o l e g a l i s s u e s and t h e r e f o r e i s not a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e 
o t h e r i s s u e s in t h i s p r o c e e d i n g . 
I I . THE UNDERLYING FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE. 
The b a s i c under ly ing f a c t s in t h i s c a s e - t h e s e r v i c e s 
B J - T i t a n per forms , the m a t e r i a l s used , the t e c h n o l o g y and e x p e r -
t i s e r e q u i r e d , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of s e r v i c e s t o m a t e r i a l s f u r n i s h e d , 
e t c . - are not in d i s p u t e . These f a c t s are c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d in 
t h e r e c o r d d e v e l o p e d at the Formal Hear ing . The Commiss ion's 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t , in l a r g e p a r t , are r e f l e c t i v e of the f a c t u a l 
r e c o r d . However, the Commission makes s e v e r a l c o n c l u s o r y f i n d -
4 
i n g s from the f a c t s t o which BJ-Ti tan o b j e c t s . BJ-Ti tan has 
a d d r e s s e d t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s in i t s B r i e f . 
3
 Is there substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that 
the "aggregate rule" for taxing the transfer of motor vehicles did not exist? 
4
 For example, Finding of Fact #14 where the Commission concludes: "Thus 
i t i s the well operators (customers of BJ-Titan) that convert the materials 
(cement) acquired from BJ-Titan into real property"; or Finding of Fact #15 
where the Commission concludes: "The cementing services of BJ-Titan are simi-
lar to a ready mix concrete company that s e l l s concrete to a building contrac-
tor and pumps i t to the location where i t i s needed by the contractor." 
Record (MR.H) 56-57. 
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III. THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED THE LAW. 
A sales tax is levied on every sale of tangible per-
sonal property. Utah Code Ann. S 59-15-4 (1985). However, only 
those services specifically identified in Section 59-15-4(b)-(g) 
are subject to sales taxation. Absent from Section 
59-15-4(b)-(g) is any reference to well stimulation services of a 
type rendered by BJ-Titan. Accordingly, these services are not 
subject to taxation, unless they are rendered incidental to the 
5 
sale of tangible personal property. The test, and appropriate 
inquiry, is whether the services BJ-Titan renders are incidental 
to the sale of tangible personal property. Moreover, in making 
this inquiry, the applicable law must be broadly construed in 
favor of BJ-Titan because BJ-Titan is not seeking an exemption 
from sales taxation, but contests that the services it renders 
fall outside the scope of property or services subject to taxa-
tion under the Act. 
In BJ-Titan's case, the proper inquiry was not made. 
In its Final Decision, the Commission, using an erroneous stan-
dard, concluded that well stimulation services were taxable 
because they were "a necessary component of the final product and 
is [sic] taxable." R. 60. The Commission has confused "neces-
sary" with "incidental." Services are taxable only when inciden-
tal, not necessary, to the sale of tangible personal property. 
The Commission continues this erroneous construction of the law 
5
 Butler v. State Tax Conm'n, 13 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852 (1962) and Western 
Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Conan'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935). 
6
 Parson Asphalt Products Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980). 
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in its Brief: "The services that BJ-Titan provides to its cus-
tomers in-the sale of these products is a necessary component of 
these products and is thus taxable." Commission Brief at 11-12 
(emphasis added). 
BJ-Titan agrees that the services it renders are neces-
sary to well stimulation, just as an orthodontist's or dentist's 
services are necessary to correcting an overbite or crowning a 
tooth, but that is not the test. Necessary is not incidental. 
Until the Commission recognizes this distinction, it will con-
tinue to erroneously interpret the applicable law. 
For example, the Commission states that "all services 
which are rendered in connection with the sale of tangible per-
7 
sonal property are subject to sales tax." This statement is not 
correct. The Act imposes a sales tax only on those services 
which are specifically set forth in the statute. Under case law, 
those services which are incidental to the sale of tangible per-
sonal property are also taxed. All services falling outside the 
scope of these two areas are not subject to sales taxation. 
BJ-Titan went to great lengths to establish in the 
record the substantial nature of the services it renders, both in 
terms of total invoice cost and the expertise and technology 
involved in the well stimulation process. The record reflects 
that these services are not incidental to the sale of tangible 
personal property. For this reason, in the Final Decision there 
7
 Commission Brief at 15 (emphasis added); and "Section 59-15-4 and the 
corresponding tax regulations, taken as a whole, evidence that all services 
which are rendered in conjunction with the retail sale of tangible personal 
property are subject to sales tax." Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
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are no specific findings or conclusions that services rendered by 
BJ-Titan ate incidental. 
The Commission argues that BJ-Titan "exaggerates" its 
technical expertise because it relies on information provided by 
the well operator such as well logs, drilling records, etc. Com-
mission Brief at 18. This reasoning is without merit for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it contradicts the specific findings of 
the Commission: "Without the expertise of the employees of the 
Petitioner, the raw chemicals or cement are of little value to 
the well operators. . . . " R. 55. Second, it also contradicts a 
statement quoted by the Commission in the preceding paragraph of 
its Brief: "the product's usefulness depends upon proper instal-
lation and the person selling that product [BJ-Titan] is usually 
the one possessing the necessary knowledge and skill to deliver 
the product and assist in putting the product into operation." 
g 
Commission B r i e f a t 17-18 ( emphas i s a d d e d ) . 
IV. MCKENDRICK IS DISTINGUISHABLE AND THUS NOT 
APPLICABLE. 
Because t h e Commission was u n a b l e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t 
B J - T i t a n ' s s e r v i c e s a r e " i n c i d e n t a l , " i t ha s a t t e m p t e d t o c h a r a c -
t e r i z e B J - T i t a n a s a m a n u f a c t u r e r of t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y 
u n d e r t h e r a t i o n a l e of McKendrick v . S t a t e Tax Commission, 9 Utah 
2d 4 1 8 , 347 P . 2 d 177 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . In i t s B r i e f , B J - T i t a n e x p l a i n s why 
McKendrick i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e and t h u s no t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e 
8
 Moreover, the Commission's reasoning disregards the economic r e a l i t i e s 
of the t ransac t ion . The Commission did not consider that the pa r t i e s are 
unrelated and dealing a t arm's length. Thus, BJ-Titan*s b i l l i ngs for services 
rendered at 200% of the cost of materials demonstrate that the services ren-
dered were considered to be substant ial by BJ-Titan and i t s customers. 
- 7 -
present f a c t s . The Commission's Brief does not respond to 
BJ-Titanfs—arguments that these wel l s t imulat ion s e r v i c e s do not 
involve the manufacture of a f in i shed product; i . e . , "the process 
of transformation through various s tages [wherein] the value [of 
the f in i shed product] i s s t e a d i l y enhanced in proportion to the 
expenditure of time f energy and s k i l l thereon." McKendrick at 
178 (emphasis added). No response i s p o s s i b l e , because for 
McKendrick to be appl icab le , there must be the syn thes i s of both 
s e r v i c e s and materia ls into the f in i shed product. Id. 
McKendrick taxed the en t i re s a l e s pr ice of the p r o s t h e t i c device 
because the labor provided was d i r e c t l y incorporated into the 
f i n i s h e d product such that the f in i shed product, as a d i r e c t 
r e s u l t of that labor, "acquired the value created by such s k i l l 
and labor." _Id. at 177. The f in i shed product was then so ld to 
9 th ird p a r t i e s . 
In BJ-Titan's case , the s e r v i c e s i t performs are not 
d i r e c t l y incorporated into a f in i shed product. BJ-Titan i s 
reta ined and compensated for i t s knowledge, exper t i s e and s e r -
v i c e s rendered in the placement of cement or chemicals in cer ta in 
c r i t i c a l zones of the wel l bore. The cement, i s nothing but 
cement, before and af ter placement. If one could extract i t , and 
reuse i t , i t would only be worth the cost of cement. There i s no 
9
 This Court emphasized that point in Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (September 19, 1990), when i t d i s t i n -
guished real property contractors from manufacturers, because real property 
contractors synthesize labor and material into a final product which becomes 
realty, whereas manufacturers synthesize labor and materials to produce a 
finished product (other tangible personal property) which i s then held for 
resale . Id. at 7. 
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proportionate increase in the value of the cement itself as a 
result of Jthe services BJ-Titan renders. BJ-Titan does not cre-
ate a finished product which is then held for resale, BJ-Titan 
is not a manufacturer; therefore, McKendrick is not applicable. 
V. NO FINISHED PRODUCT IS CREATED IN ACIDIZING 
AND FRACTURING SERVICES. 
With respect to BJ-Titan's acidizing and fracturing 
services, there is likewise no manufacture or production of a 
finished product proportionately more valuable in relation to 
services performed thereon. The fact is that there is no fin-
ished product manufactured. Chemicals are injected into a well 
to stimulate well flow. Moreover, in acidizing and fracturing 
services, the chemicals used represent an even smaller percentage 
of the total contract price. 
The only statement the Commission makes with regard to 
fracturing and acidizing services is that they do not become part 
of the real property. This argument relates to the real prop-
erty contractor issue and does not explain why, or how, or even 
if, the Commission made a determination that these services were 
incidental to the sale of tangible personal property. Clearly, 
where BJ-Titan performs an acidizing or fracturing job, it is not 
selling tangible personal property, but is retained to perform a 
service; i.e., to stimulate the well. 
VI. HARDY IS AN APPROPRIATE ANALOGY. 
Contrary to the Commission's argument, Hardy v. State 
Tax Commission, 561 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1977) is the appropriate pre-
cedent because the legal test followed in that case demonstrates 
the existing law in Utah. The Commission argues that all 
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services rendered in connection with the sale of tangible per-
sonal property an* subject to a sales tax. Hardy shows this 
statement to be incorrect. In Hardy, the dentist transferred 
tangible personal property which was held to be subject to sales 
tax, but the services rendered thereto were not taxable because 
they were not incidental. The Commission correctly notes that 
the Court in Hardy accepted the fact that the services rendered 
were substantial. Being substantial, they were not subject to 
tax even though tangible personal property was being transferred 
and that property was subject to sales tax. BJ-Titan draws the 
same analogy and concludes its services are likewise substantial 
and should be excluded from the scope of taxation even though a 
sales tax is imposed on the property transferred in conjunction 
with that service. 
The analogy to a dentist, orthodontist or any other 
service oriented practice which includes the transfer of tangible 
personal property is appropriate. In these professions, as in 
the well stimulation industry, the "essence of the transaction" 
or the "true object" of a customer is to retain the services of 
the professional, and have that professional render his expertise 
to achieve a specific, and usually technically difficult, result. 
In Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 148 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26, 29 (November 27, 1990) this Court stated: 
[T]his Court has twice used the essence of 
the transaction test in considering whether 
the tangible materials used or the personal 
services rendered in a transaction consti-
tuted the essence of the transaction. 
-10-
If the true object of the transaction was the cement or 
chemicals ,__the well owner could purchase those materials itself 
(and save 200% of the cost). The record clearly shows the 
essence of the transaction is not the acquisition of the materi-
als themselves, but the retention of BJ-Titan's expertise and 
abilities to achieve enhanced well flow through the specialized 
and sophisticated placement of chemicals or cement in critical 
zones of the well bore. Because the essence of the transaction 
is the services being rendered, these services are not incidental 
to the sale of tangible personal property and are not subject to 
taxation. 
The Commission distinguishes the above analogy on the 
basis that the dentist makes his own diagnosis and then treats 
the patient, whereas BJ-Titan, at times, relies on the well oper-
ator to supply information regarding a particular well. This 
rationale loses focus on the fact that the sales tax is imposed 
on the tangible personal property being transferred and inciden-
tal services rendered thereto. Immaterial to this inquiry is 
whether an individual does his own diagnosis, or relies on 
records of others. The important fact is that the dentist, as 
BJ-Titan, is the party who has the technical expertise to assim-
ilate diagnostic data and actually performs a sophisticated task 
to accomplish a specific result. The focus is on what services 
are actually rendered, and are they incidental to the transfer of 
tangible personal property. If the essence of the transaction is 
the rendition of technical expertise in the form of services, 
those services are not incidental. As in Hardy, the services 
-11-
rendered by BJ-Titan were substantial and the essence of the 
transaction^, and should not be taxed. 
VII. BJ-TITAN IS A REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR. 
In its Brief, the Conunission sets forth various reasons 
why BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor. First, the Com-
mission states that the manner in which BJ-Titan reported sales 
taxes should be determinative as to how it is taxed. Commission 
Brief at 24. Second, the Commission argues that "BJ-Titan's oil 
and gas well stimulation operations do not consist of converting 
taxable personal property into real property." _Id. Third, the 
Commission argues that because BJ-Titan's contracts set forth 
that BJ-Titan is under the "direction, supervision and control of 
the owner" that BJ-Titan cannot be a real property contractor. 
Id. Finally, the Commission argues that it is the well operator 
who is the real property contractor because the "well operator is 
in large part responsible for the physical placement of chemicals 
and cement into the well." Id. at 25. 
As to the first argument (manner of payment), to follow 
the form of a transaction while ignoring its substance is con-
trary to established legal precedent. As summarized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helverinq, 293 U.S. 
465, 470 (1935) (a landmark tax case repeatedly cited for the 
proposition that form should not be elevated over substance), "to 
hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to 
deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious 
purpose." 
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As to the second argument (that BJ-Titan's operations 
do not consist of converting tangible personal property into real 
property), the Commission already made the following specific 
findings: 
5. Cementing involves the placement of var-
ious cementing compositions, fluids, and 
slurry compositions, into various places in 
the well. 
9. Without the expertise of the employees 
of the Petitioner, the raw chemicals or 
cement are of little value to the well 
operators . . . . 
11. The customer is purchasing the final 
product in the hole where it has its only 
value to the customer. The final product has 
value to the customers of BJ-Titan only after 
the materials and services together have been 
provided to the customers [i.e., the place-
ment of the cement or chemicals in the well]. 
13. Concerning cementing services, BJ-Titan 
synthesizes materials and services to provide 
a finished product which stabilizes the pipe 
located in the well. Once poured, the cement 
cannot be removed. The cement permanently 
affixes the casing to the surrounding hole 
and becomes real property. 
R. 54-56 (emphasis added). 
These findings show that BJ-Titan converts tangible 
personal property (the cement) into real property. The arguments 
now raised by the Commission, that BJ-Titan's operations do not 
convert tangible personal property into real property, or that it 
is the well operator who actually converts the cement into 
realty, are contrary to the Commission's own findings and the 
underlying record. 
The record clearly establishes that well stimulation 
services are technical and sophisticated, and can only be 
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accomplished by those trained to do so using specialized 
equipments— BJ-Ti4:an has this technical expertise and special-
ized equipment. The well owner does not have the expertise, nor 
the equipment, to perform well stimulation services. For these 
12 
reasons, the customer never performs any of the services. 
Tr. 76 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
Q (By Mr. Miller) Mr. Cramer, do the oil well owners have the 
expertise to perform these services for themselves? 
A No. Specialized equipment is necessary, and other technical 
guidance is very necessary. It's a very specialized business. 
Tr. 79 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
So it requires a lot of knowledge about the formation. You may 
adequately stimulate a sandstone with an acid treatment. You may 
destroy it also. . . . And, again, a lot of chemical understand-
ing needs to go into every acidizing treatment. You need to get 
samples of the oil from that well or nearby well. You have to 
know about the formation. 
Tr. 71-72 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
A lot of technique has to go into every single job. . . . You 
have to use various techniques that are going to vary with each 
individual formation to accomplish this. 
Tr. 144 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer): 
Q Could your customers perform a cementing operation without 
your equipment? 
A NO. 
Q Could they do it without the expertise that you also 
provide? 
A No. 
Tr. 92 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer) (emphasis added): 
Q (By Mr. Miller) One more redirect on that. When you talked 
a moment ago about BJ-Titan Services* policy, does the customer at 
any time perform any of these services physically? 
A (By Mr. Cramer) No. 
-14-
A c c o r d i n g l y , BJ-Ti tan i s the l a s t par ty (because i t i s the o n l y 
p a r t y ) t o -deal wi th the m a t e r i a l s be fore placement i n t o the w e l l . 
BJ-Ti tan consumes and c o n v e r t s t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l proper ty i n t o 
r e a l t y . 
D e s p i t e t h i s uncontrover ted e v i d e n c e , the Commission 
argues t h a t i t i s the w e l l operator t h a t c o n v e r t s the m a t e r i a l s 
i n t o r e a l p r o p e r t y . The Commission s t a t e s t h a t the " t r a n s c r i p t 
i s r e p l e t e w i th t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the w e l l o p e r a t o r i s in 
l a r g e par t r e s p o n s i b l e for the p h y s i c a l placement of c h e m i c a l s 
and cement i n t o the w e l l . " Commission Br ie f at 24-25 (emphasis 
a d d e d ) . This s ta tement i s not c o r r e c t . The o n l y f u n c t i o n the 
w e l l o p e r a t o r performs in the p h y s i c a l placement of c h e m i c a l s or 
cement i n t o the w e l l i s the preparatory and m i n i s t e r i a l t a s k s of 
a t t a c h i n g some, not a l l , mechanical d e v i c e s t o the s t r i n g , and 
13 l ower ing t h e s t r i n g i n t o the w e l l . T h e r e a f t e r the p h y s i c a l 
p lacement of cement or chemica l s i s done by B J - T i t a n . 
I t must be r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the most important and c r i t -
i c a l a s p e c t of w e l l s t i m u l a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i s the i n j e c t i o n p r o -
c e s s . That i s when c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s have t o be made based on 
. . . 14 
t h e moni tor ing and feedback of the i n j e c t i o n p r o c e s s . The 
1 J
 Even when the well operator attaches these devices, i t i s done under the 
supervision of BJ-Titan. "There are guide shoes, float col lars , centralizers, 
mechanical aids in the cementing process that are supplied by us that [ s ic ] we 
have supervisors out there to make sure that they are installed properly." 
Tr. 85 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer) (emphasis added). 
1 4 MA lot of these decisions are made on location. There are changes that 
are made based on the pressure response. I have a s l ide here later which 
shows treatment monitoring. A lot of on-the-fly decisions that are made in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t the e n t i r e p h y s i c a l i n s t a l l a t i o n of m a t e r i -
a l s i s d o n e - b y B J - T i t a n , and t h a t t h i s i s the c r i t i c a l t a s k in 
t h e i n j e c t i o n p r o c e s s . 
The Commission has not f o l l o w e d the a p p r o p r i a t e t e s t or 
made t h e r e l e v a n t inqu iry in t h i s c a s e . The t e s t does not f o c u s 
on c o n t r a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n s , or the manner in which s a l e s t a x e s are 
r e p o r t e d , but ra ther on the s u b s t a n c e of what i s t a k i n g p l a c e . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , as s t a t e d by t h i s Court in Utah Concrete Product s 
Corp. v . S t a t e Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513 , 125 P.2d 4 0 8 , 410 
( 1 9 4 2 ) : 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
order to get the desired result , which i s an increased well bore ratings." 
Tr. 78 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer). 
"Now, during the job the cement operator is looking to his pressures, he 
has a pressure gauge which monitors this pressure, the injection pressure down 
the hold. And they're also monitoring the turn rates." Tr. 93 (Testimony of 
Mr. Cramer). 
"And if either one of these parameters may change, we may do something 
different to more expediently accomplish this feat. We may from that feedback 
information increase our rates . If we don't increase our rates, we may not 
get this t e s t . We may decrease our rates, depending on the technical knowl-
edge and experience of the cementing operator out there. . . . " Id. 
"This just shows the control headquarters, and there are quite a number 
of cement jobs. More and more we're actually running jobs from a control van. 
You can see the numerous gauges that these people are looking at during a 
treatment. And the numerous things they are controlling a lot of them — 
they're controlling surfactants [ s ic ] additions continuously, cross-linking 
agents, sands." Tr. 140 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer). 
"They're monitoring that with nuclear densimeters, with optical encod-
ers . You can see the walkie-talkie communication headsets. They are in con-
stant communication with their people throughout the whole job, getting feed-
back from them." Id. 
"There are a whole series of duplicate double checks during a job to 
make sure that we are actually pumping what we want to pump, that we are actu-
a l l y getting accurate feedback." Id. 
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The paramount question then turns upon the 
propos i t ion of whether the contractors to 
j/hom p l a i n t i f f s so ld the ir products were 
"users" or "consumers" within the meaning of 
the act or whether they were mere dealers in 
the product's r e s e l l i n g to the third p a r t i e s . 
Clear ly , BJ-Titan i s the consumer of the cement, for i t 
i s BJ-Titan that performs the serv ice to place that cement in the 
w e l l . BJ-Titan purchased the raw materials "not for r e s e l l i n g 
them as such in the ir or ig ina l form, but for the purpose of 
changing t h e i r very nature from personal to real property." 
Tummurro Trades at 7 ( c i t i n g Utah Concrete). As Mr. Anderson 
t e s t i f i e d , BJ-Titan i s a real property contractor because "they 
[BJ-Titan] are performing the labor that converts t h i s cement 
into i t s f i n a l product or form. In other words, you don't have 
the owner of the wel l coming out and doing addit ional things to 
15 that cement a f ter i t ' s poured." Tr. 177. 
The Commission incorrect ly argues that BJ-Titan f a l l s 
within the scope of McKendrick. Yet the Commission cannot con-
s i s t e n t l y argue that BJ-Titan synthesized labor and mater ia l s , 
making i t subject to tax on the f u l l purchase pr ice under 
McKendrick's r a t i o n a l e , and then ignore that rat iona le to avoid a 
conclusion that BJ-Titan i s a real property contractor under the 
1 5
 The Commission offers the testimony of Mr. Ashcroft, an auditor and 
employee of the Commission, who concluded that BJ-Titan was not a real prop-
erty contractor based on his rhetorical question: "So how can you say that 
they [BJ-Titan] are indeed instal l ing the cement, when in actuality i t appears 
that a l l they're doing i s delivering i t to the job s i t e and pumping that 
cement down the well." Tr. 214. The incontroverted record (see footnote 14 
supra) demonstrates the fallacy of Mr. Ashcroft's rhetoric. 
1 6
 "McKendrick disposes of the issue in the present case." Commission 
Brief at 20. 
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rationale of Utah Concrete. To so conclude is arbitrary and a 
clear abus*—of agency discretion. 
Finally, to conclude that BJ-Titan is not the real 
property contractor because of certain contractual provisions, 
once again ignores the substance of the relationship between 
BJ-Titan and the customer. As in any transaction, where one 
party is performing work for another, the customer always has the 
ultimate authorization as to how, when, where, etc. a project is 
conducted. Equally so, in the present case, the contractual 
terms reflect that the customer has the right to direct what, how 
or when something is to be done, but the right to control does 
not translate into ability or actual performance. Nor does the 
Act impose a sales tax liability on the well owner because he 
supervises or directs construction of a project. It is the party 
who actually performs the service who is considered the real 
property contractor. While recommendations are made to the cus-
tomer, who may even have an understanding of the technology, and 
who may even participate in the development of what is to be 
done, once the customer approves a given recommendation, BJ-Titan 
is exclusively responsible for implementation of that 
17 
recommendation. If anything goes wrong it is BJ-Titan who is 
fiscally responsible for damage to a well, not the well owner. 
17
 "They're going to discuss the job procedure, and then the customer turns 
over the performance of the cementing job to us. He doesn't get up there and 
run the cement trucks. He doesn't have the talent or the skills to do that, 
or the experience, or if he does, he wouldn't be allowed to anyway, because 
it's strictly against our policy. Only BJ-Titan people can—are allowed to 
operate this equipment." Tr. 89 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer). 
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VIII. ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE 
-A^  The Isolated Or -Occasional Sale Provisions are an 
Exception, Not Exemption, to Taxation, The distinction between 
an exception and an exemption from taxation is very important as 
to the broad or narrow construction of the applicable law to be 
given by the courts. The Commission repeatedly refers to the 
isolated or occasional sale provisions as an exemption, see Com-
mission Brief at 28, and argues for a narrow construction of its 
terms in favor of the Commission, Id. at 35. 
While the isolated or occasional provisions are an 
exemption from sales taxation under present law (see Utah Code 
Ann. 59-12-104(14) (1990)}, under the law as in effect in 1985, 
the isolated or occasional sale provisions were an exception to 
the definition of a "retail sale" set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-15-2(5) (1985) and thus an isolated or occasional sale was 
not subject to tax. The business reorganization provisions are 
likewise found in Section 59-15-2(5) (1985) and set forth that 
motor vehicles transferred in a business reorganization qualify 
as an isolated or occasional sale. Accordingly, these statutory 
provisions "should generally be construed favorable to the tax-
payer and strictly against the taxing authority. . . ." Parson 
at 398 (citation omitted). 
B. No Sale Took Place. The Act provides for a tax on 
the retail sale of tangible personal property. For a tax to be 
imposed, there must be a sale. BJ-Titan argues that no sale has 
taken place in the transfer of motor vehicles to BJ-Titan in con-
junction with the formation of the partnership. Rather, this was 
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a non-taxable (as i t i s for federal and s t a t e income tax pur-
poses) contr ibut ion to cap i ta l on the formation of a new e n t i t y . 
Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have s i m i l a r l y held that no s a l e s 
tax appl i e s on the transfer of a s s e t s to a newly organized e n t i t y 
18 for a lack of cons iderat ion . The Commission l ikewise acknowl-
edges that "arguably there was never a s a l e of an ' e n t i r e b u s i -
ness ' but only a transfer of certa in a s s e t s to a newly formed 
partnership . . . ." Commission Brief at 28. Yet the Commis-
s i o n ' s only response i s to s t a t e that "the v e h i c l e s transferred 
by BJ Hughes and Titan Services were ev ident ly an except ion to 
the i s o l a t e d or occas ional s a l e and hence subject to Utah s a l e s 
t ax ." jua. However, BJ-Titan i s not arguing that the transfer of 
motor v e h i c l e s q u a l i f i e s as an i s o l a t e d or occas ional s a l e f but 
that no s a l e took p lace . Thus the transfer should be treated as 
a non-taxable transact ion for s a l e s tax purposes, as i t i s 
t reated for income tax purposes. 
C. The Vehic les Transferred to BJ-Titan Were Not of a 
Type Required to be Registered. Utah Code Ann. S 59-15-2(5) 
(1985) provides that the transfer of v e h i c l e s "of a type required 
to be r e g i s t e r e d under the provis ions of the motor v e h i c l e s laws 
s h a l l [not ] be deemed i s o l a t e d or occas iona l ." Likewise, Rule 
1 8
 See IBEC Industries, Inc. v. Lindleyy 405 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 1980) (the 
reorganization of a corporation by contributing the assets and l i a b i l i t i e s of 
a divis ion in exchange for stock of a newly formed subsidiary i s not a taxable 
sale for lack of consideration); and Roberts & Sonsf Inc. v. Kosydar, 330 
N.E.2d 437 (Ohio 1975) (transfer of partnership assets , including motor vehi-
c l e registered in the name of one of the partners but used in partnership 
business, to newly-formed corporation where shareholders maintained same per-
centage ownership as in partnership held not a taxable sale for lack of con-
sideration); see also Northern Telecom Inc. v. 01 sen, 679 S.W. 2d 488 (Tenn. 
1984). 
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38S provides that "vehicles required to be titled or registered" 
(emphasis—added) are not isolated or occasional sales. 
BJ-Titan's vehicles are not subject to registration pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. $ 41-1-19(1) (a) because the 
motor vehicles are "of a type" described in paragraph (l)(a) 
which are excepted from registration. 
The Commission argues that Section 59-12-2(5) is con-
cerned "with the classification of vehicles for imposition of 
state sales tax, not whether the vehicles are actually registered 
in the state of Utah." Commission Brief at 29. BJ-Titan agrees. 
The transfer of motor vehicles to BJ-Titan should be treated as 
an isolated or occasional sale, not because the vehicles are 
titled in Texas as opposed to Utah, but because the classifica-
tion set up by Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-19 excepts BJ-Titan's motor 
vehicles from registration. 
The Commission cites Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-19 for the 
proposition that all vehicles are subject to registration as 
follows: 
(1) Every motor vehicle, combination of 
vehicles, trailer, and semitrailer when 
driven or moved upon a highway is subject to 
the registration and certificate of title 
provisions of this chapter. . . 
Commission Brief at 29. Conveniently absent from this citation 
is the final word of paragraph (1); i.e., "except". The omitted 
word introduces nine classifications of vehicles "of a type" not 
required to be registered in Utah. Under the Commission's inter-
pretation, all vehicles would be excluded from the definition of 
an isolated sale because all vehicles are "of a type" required to 
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be registered. There would be no exceptions. If other states 
were to adopt this rationale, they could also impose a tax on 
BJ-Titan on the transfer of vehicles because these vehicles oper-
ate in multi-states. Using registration as a qualifier, this 
avoids multiple taxation of the same transaction by various 
states. 
D. Business Reorganization Exception. BJ-Titan 
argues that the transfer of motor vehicles was done pursuant to a 
"business reorganization where the ownership of the transferee 
organization is substantially the same as the ownership of the 
transferor organization." Section 59-15-2(5). The Commission 
held that the ownership of the transferee corporation was not 
"substantially the same" as the transferor corporation. R. 63. 
At issue then is what level of continuing ownership in the new 
organization, following a "business reorganization", constitutes 
substantially the same. For a statutory merger or 
19 . 
consolidation to qualify as an reorganization, the continuity 
of ownership in the new organization need only be a "majority." 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-115(9)(a). Yet, the Commission is unwill-
ing to look to the Utah income tax statues for a definition of 
"substantially the same" ownership in business reorganization, 
and suggests that the Court look instead to federal income tax 
provisions. The rationale behind this suggestion is confusing 
because Utah has adopted and follows the federal provisions. The 
19
 As discussed in BJ-Titan1 s Brief at 41, the Commission technically ruled 
that the transfer of vehicles to BJ-Titan was a consolidation; i.e., two enti-
ties transferring assets to form a new entity. 
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error is that the Commission wants "substantially the same" own-
ership in--a business reorganization to be 80% because that is 
what Mr. Cook said the IRS uses. Tr. 241. Unfortunately, Mr. 
Cook is wrong. Pursuant to I.R.C. S368(a)(1)(A), which is the 
federal statutory provision for statutory merger and consolida-
tion reorganizations, the I.R.S. follows the same majority 
20 
requirement for continuity of ownership interest. 
E. Substantial Evidence Demonstrates That The Commis-
sion Followed an Aggregate Rule. Mr. Anderson's testimony, Mr. 
Cook's admissions, and the documentary evidence provided at the 
Formal Hearing clearly show that until 1986, the Commission fol-
lowed a policy of taxing the transfer of motor vehicles to part-
nerships on the aggregate basis. Tr. 159-160; Exhibit 5, R. 
226-7; and Exhibit 6, R. 228-40. Following an advisory opinion 
letter from the Utah Attorney General's Office, the Commission 
changed that policy, and adopted the entity approach which it is 
now imposing on BJ-Titan. 
This change in policy (or adoption of a new policy) in 
1986, and its application to BJ-Titan, is improper and illegal 
for failure to comply with the provisions Administrative Rulemak-
ing Act which in 1986 provided (Section 63-46a-3(3)(1986): 
(3) Rulemaking is required when: 
(a) agency actions affect a class of 
persons; 
^° See I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 which indicates that the 
I.R.S. will issue a favorable ruling that a transaction qualifies as a reorga-
nization under I.R.C. S 368(a)(1)(A) if, among other requirements, the prior 
owners [the transferors] continue to own 50% or more of the equity in the new 
entity [the transferee]. 
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(b) agency actions affect the opera-
tions of another agency; or 
(c) statutory or federal mandate 
requires rules. 
Adoption of the entity rule constitutes agency action 
which affects a class of persons. The Commission failed to fol-
low prescribed rulemaking procedures before implementing the 
entity test. Contrary to law, the "entity11 test was adopted on 
an ad hoc basis by Commission personnel. Tr. 241. 
In response, the Commission argues that no policy or 
rule ever existed because these was nothing in writing, only an 
informal policy. However, according to Section 63-46a-2(8)(a) 
(1986), there is no requirement that a rule or policy be written. 
As long as the agency action applies to a general class of per-
sons, and implements or interprets policy made by the statute, it 
constitutes a rule. The result suggested by the Commission is 
not proper. Just because a policy is not in writing does not 
prevent that policy from having the effect of a rule. If so, the 
Commission could adopt any policy it chooses, force it upon Utah 
taxpayers as a rule, but avoid rule-making procedures by never 
reducing the policy to writing. Regardless of whether the policy 
was unwritten, informal or otherwise, the fact remains that the 
Commission is applying the entity test to taxpayers without hav-
21 ing adopted that policy through valid rulemaking procedures. 
Finally, the Commission argues that even if it had 
adopted such a rule, BJ-Titan failed to rely upon it to its 
21
 See Williams v. Public Service Ccxnmission, 720 P.2d 773 (1986) (where 
this Court held certain actions of the PSC constituted a de facto rule). 
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detriment. This policy is now being forced upon BJ-Titan to its 
detriment. It is an improper and illegal policy of the Commis-
sion which does not become legitimized because a taxpayer failed 
to take any previous action in reliance thereto. There is no 
requirement of reliance, and BJ-Titan is not prohibited from con-
testing the legality of a rule being applied to it. BJ-Titan 
appropriately raised the issue before the Commission, and is 
entitled to contest its impropriety. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
BJ-Titan is engaged in the business of providing well 
stimulation services. The essence of its service transactions 
are to obtain enhanced well flow. These services are substantial 
in nature and are not incidental to the sale of tangible personal 
property. Additionally, because the services rendered by 
BJ-Titan relate to real property, the cost of services provided 
are likewise non-taxable. Finally, the transfer of vehicles 
qualifies as an isolated or occasional sale; if not, then the 
Agency should be precluded from applying the entity test as it 
failed to follow required rulemaking procedures. 
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